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Case No. 20080662
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Russell Hurt,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Defendant was a passenger in a car stopped for a traffic violation that resulted
in the driver's arrest on an outstanding warrant. Defendant was detained pending a
search of the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest. Prior to
conducting that search, Trooper Wurtz ordered defendant out of the car and asked
if he had any weapons, which questioning lead to the discovery of drugs and
paraphernalia on defendant's person.

1. Were officers justified in searching the passenger compartment of the
vehicle on the ground that defendant, who was not secured, could gain access to the
car and retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence?
Standard of Review. The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski,
2004 UT 94, Tf 11,100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed
non-deferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to
the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, Tf 15,103 P.3d 699.
2. Can defendant prevail on his challenge to the trial court's admission of the
drug evidence, where he does not acknowledge or attack the basis of the trial court's
ruling, that he voluntarily consented to the search of his person?
Standard of Review. Since defendant does not challenge the basis for the trial
court's ruling admitting the drug evidence, no standard of review applies.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
U. S. CONST. Amend IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

2

UtahR.App. P. 24(a)(9):
An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp.
2008), and possession of paraphernalia, class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (West Supp. 2008). R6-5.
Motion

to

suppress

denied.

Defendant

moved

to

suppress

methamphetamine and paraphernalia seized during a warrantless search of his
person. R31-27. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that defendant
voluntarily consented to the search. R66-62 (a copy of the trial court's "Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress" is
attached in addendum A).
Plea bargain and conditional guilty plea. Defendant entered a conditional
guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and the
paraphernalia charge was dismissed. R76-70.

3

Sentence. The trial court imposed an indeterminate term of from zero-to-five
years. R92. The trial court then stayed imposition of the prison term and placed
defendant on a 36-month term of probation. Id.
Timely appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R94.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial court entered the following factual findings in support of its ruling
denying the motion to suppress:
1. On August 20, 2007, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Trooper David
Wurtz of the Utah Highway Patrol was patrolling in the area of SR 248
mile marker 6, in Wasatch County.
2. Trooper Wurtz observed a black, Volkswagen Jetta traveling 87
miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone.
3. Trooper Wurtz executed a traffic stop on the vehicle and
approached the driver side.
4. After obtaining identifying information of the driver, Grant Black,
Trooper Wurtz ran the driver for warrants. Trooper Wurtz was told by
dispatch that Mr. Black had a $1,000 warrant for his arrest, and to use
caution because Mr. Black had prior involvements with drugs,
specifically methamphetamine. Upon receiving this information,
Trooper Wurtz placed Mr. Black under arrest.
5. Trooper Wurtz then spoke with the passenger, the defendant,
inquiring as to whether he would be willing to take Mr. Black's vehicle.

4

The defendant did not have a driver's license in his possession, and a
subsequent license check confirmed that his license was not valid, f1]
6. At this time, Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant to step out of the
vehicle so that the vehicle could be searched incident to arrest, to which
the defendant complied.
7. Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant if he had any weapons on him,
to which the defendant replied that he did not.
8. The defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he does carry
pocket knives on occasion, but that he does not own any firearms.
9. Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant to pull his front pockets inside
out so that he could confirm that the defendant did not have any
weapons. [2]
10. Tropper Wurtz then asked the defendant to turn around so that he
could observe the defendant's back pockets.
11. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that the
defendant was wearing painter pants with pockets on the thigh area,
and that he observed a hard eyeglass case approximately 1.5 inches
thick and 6 [inches] long sticking out of the pocket. Trooper Wurtz
testified that the eyeglass case was capable of containing a knife or
small firearm.
12. Trooper Wurtz then asked the defendant if he would pull out the
eyeglass case and open it to confirm that there were no weapons inside,
to which the defendant complied. However, the defendant opened
and shut the case very quickly not allowing Trooper Wurtz an
opportunity to see inside the eyeglass case. This behavior caused
1

When Trooper Wurtz informed Black that defendant could not drive his
vehicle, Black "said he had already called his sister from Kamas and she was coming
to pick up the vehicle." R99:7-8.
2

In response, defendant "pulled his front pockets out," revealing that he had
no weapons therein. R99:8.
5

Trooper Wurtz to believe that the defendant was trying to obstruct his
view of the inside of the eyeglass case and that the defendant was
trying to hide something.
13. Trooper Wurtz then asked the defendant to open the eyeglass case
again so that he could confirm that there were no weapons inside the
eyeglass case. The defendant complied with this request and Trooper
Wurtz was able to observe drug paraphernalia inside the eyeglass case.
The defendant then threw the eyeglass case on top of the vehicle.
14. At no time did Trooper Wurtz execute a frisk of the defendant's
person.
15. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that at no time
did he assert a claim of authority to search the defendant, or exhibit
any force upon the defendant to get him to comply with his requests.
16. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that the
defendant showed no aggression, and was cooperative in all requests
made of him.
17. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that there were
[three] other officers present at the scene, each arriving at different
times, including another UHP trooper, and two Summit County
deputies. Both Summit County deputies were not actively involved in
the stop as the location was just outside their jurisdiction.
18. The defendant testified that he had a dog in the vehicle at the time
of the stop, and that the two Summit County deputies retrieved the
dog from him.
19. Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that his intent
was to execute a search of Mr. Black's vehicle incident to arrest, along
with the other UHP trooper, and therefore he had officer safety
concerns with his back being turned to the defendant during the search
and his inability to maintain a constant visual on the defendant during
the search of the vehicle.

6

20. Trooper Wurtz testified that in his experience it takes only seconds
for an individual to assault a police officer.
21. The Court found at the suppression hearing that Trooper Wurtz
could have conducted the search of the vehicle on his own and that the
other UHP trooper could have maintained a visual on the defendant
during the search of the vehicle.
22. The defendant has no prior felony convictions, but does have two
prior convictions for domestic violence assault, and one prior
conviction for making a false report.
R66-63.
Based on these findings, the trial court ruled that 1) Trooper Wurtz lawfully
ordered defendant out of the vehicle, 2) defendant was lawfully detained pending a
search of the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest, and that 3) the
drug evidence found on defendant's person ''was seized pursuant to the consent of
the defendant." R63. In support of its consent ruling, the trial court reiterated
that the officer did not command defendant to produce the eyeglass
case in which the contraband was discovered. There was no show of
force used by the officer; there was an absence of a claim of authority to
search, the [defendant cooperated with the request of the officer, and
there was an absence of deception or trick.
Id. (a copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress, is included in Addendum A).

7

SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T
Point I. The trial court ruled that defendant, a passenger, was lawfully
detained incident to the traffic stop of the driver, pending a search of the
passenger compartment of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest. Since the
trial court ruled in this case, however, the United States Supreme Court has held
in Arizona v. Gant, a case that did not involve any passengers, that officers m a y
search a vehicle incident to the driver's arrest only if the driver/arrestee is within
reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search, or the officer has reason
to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. These
justifications for a passenger compartment search of the vehicle do not exist on
this record. Nevertheless, officers here were justified in searching the passenger
compartment incident to the driver's arrest on the ground that defendant, an
unsecured passenger, could gain access to the car and retrieve a weapon or
destroy evidence. Defendant's detention following the driver's arrest was
therefore lawful. Gant does not control the outcome.
Even assuming, however, that Gant applies even where there is an
unsecured passenger present, Gant constitutes a new rule of Fourth Amendment
law that should not be applied retroactively.

8

Alternatively, even if Gant applies when there is an unsecured passenger,
and is also retroactive, defendant's detention was justified on the ground that
there was further need to control the scene. The United States Supreme Court
also recently clarified in Arizona v. Johnson, that passengers are reasonably
detained incident to a traffic stop until there is no further need to control the
scene. There was further need to control the scene here because officers were
required to remain on the scene at least until the driver's sister arrived to retrieve
the vehicle. Releasing defendant prior to the sister's arrival would have
unnecessarily jeopardized their safety. The Fourth Amendment does not require
this.
Point II. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling that he consented
to the search of his person is inadequately briefed. Defendant ignores the
consent basis of the trial court's ruling, asserting only that Trooper Wurtz lacked
reasonable suspicion to conduct a weapons frisk. Consequently, defendant's
challenge to the trial court's ruling is inadequately briefed and should be rejected
on that ground.

9

ARGUMENT
I.
OFFICERS WERE JUSTIFIED IN SEARCHING THE PASSENGER
COMPARTMENT OF THE VEHICLE ON THE GROUND THAT
DEFENDANT, AN UNSECURED PASSENGER, COULD GAIN
ACCESS TO THE CAR AND RETRIEVE A WEAPON OR DESTROY
EVIDENCE
In Point I of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling that he was
lawfully detained pending a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle
incident to the driver's arrest. Aplt. Br. at 6-9. According to defendatnt, continued
detention of passengers following the driver's arrest is justified only u p o n a
showing of reasonable suspicion that they are engaged in criminal activity, or that
they may be armed and dangerous. Id. Defendant's claim lacks merit and should
therefore be rejected.
A, New York v. Belton is not limited by Arizona v. Gant where, as
here, there is an unsecured passenger.
As noted, after the trial court ruled here, the United States Supreme Court
held that police officers may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident
to the driver's arrest only when the arrestee is within reaching distance of the
vehicle, or there is reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense
of arrest. Arizona v. Gant,

S.Ct.

, 129 S.Ct. 1719,1714 (limiting New York v.

Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)). Here, the driver was secured in Trooper Wurtz's patrol
10

car before officers attempted to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle, see
R65; see also R99:7. And Trooper Wurtz had no reason to believe that the vehicle
contained evidence of the driver's suspended driving privilege. Therefore, neither
of Gant's stated justifications for searching the passenger compartment incident to
the driver's arrest is present here.
Before Gant, Belton was read to allow a search of the passenger compartment
of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest regardless of whether the arrestee was
secured. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 466, 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting majority
rests on "fiction . . . that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control
of an arrestee who has recently been in the car," and asserting under majority
approach, "the result would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had
handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing them under
arrest"); see also Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1718,1719 (observing "Justice Brennan's reading of
[Belton] has predominated," and "[u]nder this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle
search would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant
notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle's passenger compartment will not be
within the arrestee's reach at the time of the search"); State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,
1203 (Utah 1995) (recognizing Belton authorizes officers to search arrestee and "his
or her vehicle").
11

Although Gant limits Belton, Gant does not limit Belton's application here,
because Gant is distinguishable on its facts. Unlike the instant case, Gant was the
sole occupant of his vehicle. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1715. Therefore, once Gant was
secured in the back of the patrol car, there was no danger he would reach into the
car to grab a weapon or destroy evidence. Id. at 1719. Here, however, the car had
two occupants: the driver and defendant. R65. Only the former was arrested. Id.
As pointed out by Justice Alito, "it is not uncommon for an officer to arrest some but
not all of the occupants of a vehicle/ 7 Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1731, n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting,
joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy, J., & Breyer, J.). As further noted by Justice Alito,
the Gant majority "does not address the question whether in such a situation a
search of the passenger compartment may be justified on the ground that the
occupants who are not arrested could gain access to the car and retrieve a weapon
or destroy evidence/' Id. Accordingly, Gant does not limit Belton's application
where, as here, there is an unsecured passenger.

Id.

Indeed, an unsecured

passenger presents the same danger as an unsecured driver/arrestee, both of whom
"could gain access to the car and retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence." Id.
Arizona v. Johnson,

U.S.

, 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009), further supports the

lawfulness of defendant's detention. In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court
clarified that passengers are reasonably detained incident to a traffic: stop "for the
12

duration of the stop" or until "[officers] have no further need to control the scene,
and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave." 129 S.Ct. at 788 (citing
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007)). As explained, Belton still applies
when an unsecured passenger is present, even if the driver/arrestee is secured. It
necessarily follows that the officers had "further need to control the scene," or to
detain defendant until the passenger compartment search could be safely
concluded. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788. Any other rule would unnecessarily jeopardize
officer safety. The Fourth Amendment does not require this. See, e.g., Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (recognizing "too plain for argument" public
interest in officer safety "both legitimate and weighty").
The Supreme Court's clear concern for officer safety during traffic stops,
expressed most recently in Johnson, is dispositive here. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that ""[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants
[of a stopped vehicle] is minimized, . . .

if the officers routinely exercise

unquestioned command of the situation."" Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (in turn quoting Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981)) and citing Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 258 (recognizing
"reasonable for passengers to expect that an officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or

13

investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his
safety")).
Once an arrest is initiated, the risk to officer safety only increases. See United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,234-35 (1973) (recognizing "danger to an officer is far
greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect in
to custody and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the
relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop"); accord Knowles
v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113,117 (1998). The increased potential for danger encompasses
passengers, who are "every bit" as motivated as an arrested driver, "to employ
violence to prevent apprehension of . . . a crime." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414; see also
Maryland v. Fring\e, 540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003) (noting passengers ''will often be
engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in
concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing" (case citation and
quotation marks omitted).
The United States Supreme Court's concern for officer safety is not
illusory. The most recent data reveals that in 2007, 6,424 officers were assaulted
and eleven were killed during traffic pursuits or stops. See Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted,
Tables 19 & 68 (2007) ("Uniform Crime Reports") (found at http:/ www.fbi.gov/
14

ucr/killed/2007/ data/table_19. html & http:/www.fbi.gov/ ucr/killed/2007/
data/table _68.html). One of the murdered officers was killed while searching
the offender's vehicle. See Uniform Crime Reports, Table 24 (found at h t t p : / /
www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/ 2007/data/table_24. html). Utah law enforcement
officers are not immune from this danger. See Sara Israelsen-Hartley, Lehi Officer
shot: Police kill woman who opened fire, Deseret News, 24 June 2008, and Melinda
Rogers and Nate Carlisle, Woman killed after shooting Lehi cop liad histoiy of mental
illness, The Salt Lake Tribune, 24 June 2008 (copies of both articles are attached in
addendum B).
Given the above, defendant's reliance on State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, f
12,182 P.3d 935, cert granted, 182 P.3d 935 (Utah 2008), is unavailing. 3 Baker held
that "from the moment the driver was placed under arrest/ 7 in that case, there
was "no lawful reason why the passengers were detained." 2008 UT App 115,
Tf Tf 19,12. Baker's holding, that passengers are unreasonably detained once the
driver is formally arrested, id. at \ 12, can only make an already dangerous
situation more dangerous. Johnson makes plain that the Fourth Amendment
3

The Utah Supreme Court heard oral argument in Baker, and a certified
companion case dealing with the same passenger detention issue, State v. Gettling,
Case No. 20080037-SC, on 3 March 2009. The Supreme Court granted supplemental
briefing re: Arizona v. Gant, in both Baker and Gettling, on 14 May 2009.
15

does not require this. 129 S.Ct. at 788. Therefore, to the extent that Baker conflicts
with the holding in Johnson, that passengers are lawfully detained incident to a
traffic stop until there is no "further need to control the scene/ 7 Baker has been
effectively overruled. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788.
In sum, because defendant was an unsecured passenger, Gant does not
apply and Trooper Wurtz remained authorized under Belton and Johnson to
search the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest—regardless of
whether the driver/arrestee was secured. The trial court's ruling should
therefore be upheld.
B.

Arizona v. Gant is a new rule of Fourth Amendment law that
should not have retroactive application.
Even assuming arguendo that Gant controls here, Gant constitutes a clear

break with Belton, or a new rule of Fourth Amendment law that should not have
retroactive application.
In asserting that Gant should not apply retroactively here, the State recognizes
that in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), the United States Supreme Court did
away with the "'clear break' exception to the general proposition that new rules
governing criminal procedures should be retroactive to cases pending on direct
review." Id. at 326, 328. Under the clear break exception, "a new constitutional rule

16

was not applied retroactively, even to cases on direct review, if the new rule
explicitly overruled a past precedent of [the] Court, or disapproved a practice [the]
Court had arguably sanctioned in prior cases, or overturned a longstanding practice
that lower courts had uniformly approved/'

Id. at 325 (citing United States v.

Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982)).
In Griffith, the Supreme Court considered whether new rules regarding use of
peremptory challenges imposed in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applied "to
litigation pending on direct state or federal review or not yet final when Batson was
decided/' Griffith, 479 U.S. at 316. Although the new peremptory challenge rules
imposed in Batson constituted a clear break with Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965), the Supreme Court declined to except Batson from the general rule of
retroactive application, holding instead that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on
direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule
constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." Id. at 328. In so holding, the Supreme
Court emphasized that application of the clear break exception resulted 1) in casespecific analysis that was inappropriate when deciding whether a new rule applied
retroactively to cases pending on direct review, and 2) in the uneven administration
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of justice, because similarly situated defendants end up being treated dissimilarly.
M a t 327.
Because Griffith was a jury selection case, however, the Supreme Court did not
there consider the ramifications of applying new rules of Fourth Amendment law
retroactively. Where the remedy for a jury selection violation is a new trial, see id. at
319, the remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is suppression. See United States
v. Herring,

U.S.

, 129 S.Ct. 695, 699 (2009) ("[Ojur decisions establish an

exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained
evidence at trial"). "[The] judicially created [exclusionary] rule is 'designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect/" not to
make the defendant whole. Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974)).
Accordingly, the culpability of officer conduct must be considered when
analyzing the applicability of the exclusionary rule in a given case. Id. (citing United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.4 (1984)). The exclusionary rule applies only to
flagrant or deliberate Fourth Amendment violations, or "only if it can be said that
the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional." Id. at 701 (quoting Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987)).

"The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation
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occurred — i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable — does not necessarily mean
that the exclusionary rule applies." Id. at 700 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,223
(1983)). Indeed, exclusion is a "'last resort/" not a "'first impulse.'" Id. (quoting
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)). Moreover, because the exclusionary
rule is not an individual right, it is applied only when it will effectively "deter[ ]
Fourth Amendment violations in the future." Id. (citing United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347-355 (1974); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)). Finally, "the
benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs." Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 910).
The exclusionary rule should not therefore apply where it can provide only
"marginal" or "incremental deterrence." Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation
and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) and Krull, 480 U.S. at 352-53). This is
particularly true given the "'substantial societal costs'" of the rule, i.e., "letting
guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free — something that 'offends basic
concepts of the criminal justice system.'" Id. at 700-01 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 35253 and Leon, 468 U.S. at 908).
Where, as here, officers were, at the time, authorized by Belton to conduct a
search of the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest, even if the
arrestee was secured, Trooper Wurtz "did nothing improper." Herring, 129 S.Ct. at
700. Because there was no culpable conduct on the part of Trooper Wurtz when he
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acted here, "'the extreme sanction of exclusion'" is unjustified. Id. (quoting Leon, 468
U.S. at 916). This is true even if, in hindsight, a Fourth Amendment violation in fact
occurred, given Gant's subsequent limitation of Belton.
Indeed, in Herring, an officer relied on an arrest warrant that was
subsequently found to have been recalled, but which recall did not appear in the
computer database. Id. at 698. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred, but declined to apply the exclusionary rule to what
was at most a negligent failure to act, rather than a deliberate or tactical choice to
act:

"[T]his error is not enough by itself to require 'the extreme sanction of

exclusion.'" Id. at 700 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916).
If the exclusionary rule does not apply to negligent officer conduct like that at
issue in Herring, it necessarily follows that it does not apply to non-culpable officer
conduct like that at issue here. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 (declining to apply
exclusionary rule to suppress fruits of warrantless administrative search performed
in good-faith reliance on statute later declared unconstitutional). Indeed, before
Gant, it was "widely accepted" that Belton authorized a search of the passenger
compartment of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest, regardless of whether the
arrestee was secured. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1722, n. 11; see also United States v. Thornton,
541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004) (Scalia, J., with Ginsburg, J., concurring) (observing "cases

involving this precise factual scenario — a motorist handcuffed and secured in the
back of a squad car when the search takes place — are legion"); State v. Harmon, 910
P.2d 1196,1203 (Utah 1995) ("[A]ny full custodial arrest, even for a inisdemeanor
traffic violation, allows an officer to conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested
person,. . . and his or her vehicle/ 7 [Belton], 453 U.S. [at] 460"); Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), p.517, n.89 (4th ed. 2004 and Supp. 2008-2009) (collecting
cases).
Going forward, Gant instructs law enforcement officers as to the limits of a
vehicle search incident to a driver's arrest, and violations of Gant will be subject to
the exclusionary rule. But applying the exclusionary rule to officer conduct that was
lawful before Gant "overturned a longstanding practice that lower courts had
uniformly approved," Griffith, 479 U.S. at 325, can have only marginal or
incremental deterrent value, if any. Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 700. It should not therefore
be applied here.
C.

Alternatively, defendant's post-arrest detention was justified
under Arizona v. Johnson because there was further need to
control the scene, at least until the driver/arrestee's sister arrived
to retrieve the vehicle, and presumably, defendant.
Finally, even assuming that Gant applies when there is an unsecured

passenger, and that Gant applies retroactively, defendant's detention following
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the driver's arrest was nonetheless justified because he could not legally drive
the car. There thus remained "further need to control the scene," at least until
the car could be safely released to an authorized driver, moved to a temporary
parking lot, or impounded. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788.
As noted, Johnson clarified that passengers are reasonably detained
incident to a traffic stop "for the duration of the stop" or until "[officers] have no
further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are
free to leave." Id. In so clarifying, the Supreme Court re-emphasized that ""[tjhe
risk of harm to both the police and the occupants [of a stopped vehicle] is
m i n i m i z e d , . . . if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the
situation."" Id. at 786 (quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (in turn quoting Summers,
452 U.S. at 702-03)) (second brackets in original). The Supreme Court further
clarified, moreover, that "[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the
justification for the traffic s t o p , . . . do not convert the encounter into something
other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend
the duration of the stop." Id. (citing Muehler v. Menu, 544 U.S. 93,100-01 (2005)).
Finally, it is well established that an officer may order a passenger out of the car
pending completion of the stop. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415.
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Here, there was still "further need to control the scene" following the
driver's arrest. Johnson, 129 S.Ct at 788. Defendant, who was not under arrest or
otherwise secured, did not have a valid driver's license and could not therefore
drive the vehicle away. See R95; see also R99:7-8. Although, the driver had called
his sister in Kamas to retrieve his car, and presumably defendant, she had not yet
arrived. See R95; see also R99:7-8. Trooper Wurtz was thus required to remain
with the vehicle —and the unsecured defendant—until the driver's sister arrived
to retrieve them, or the vehicle could be otherwise safely secured. Cf. State v.
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 268-69 (Utah 1985) (recognizing where passenger had no
valid license, impounding car without first allowing arrestee/owner to arrange
for a third-party to move it, as per department policy, was unreasonable). There
was, thus, "further need to control the scene" following the driver's arrest.
Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788. Cf. People v. Hoyos, 162 R3d 528, 546 (Cal. 2007)
(upholding detention of driver and passenger reasonably seized following
Mimms/Wilson order to exit vehicle "at least as long as reasonably necessary for
the officer to complete the activity [an inventory search] the Mimms/Wilson order
contemplates").
Accordingly, defendant continued to be lawfully detained when Trooper
Wurtz ordered him from the car, queried him about weapons, observed a hard
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glasses case protruding from his pants pocket that was large enough to conceal a
knife or small firearm, and discovered drugs and paraphernalia therein. See R65.
Defendant does not allege that Trooper Wurtz's questioning about weapons
exceeded the scope of his detention. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. But in any event, as noted,
"[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic
s t o p , . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful
seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the
stop/ 7 Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781, 788 (citing Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100-101). Because
defendant was lawfully detained at least until the driver's sister arrived to
retrieve the vehicle, or it could be otherwise safely secured, the trooper's
questioning did not, by any measure, extend the duration of the stop. 4
In sum, even if Gant controls here, defendant's continued detention was
justified under Johnson on the ground that there was "further need to control the
scene" following the driver's arrest. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788; see also State v.
Robison, 2006 UT 65,119,147 P.3d 448 (recognizing appellate court may affirm
judgment below where sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on
record, even though such ground or theory not considered by lower court).

4

The lawfulness of the search of the glasses case is addressed in Point II.
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II.
DEFENDANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON HIS CHALLENGE TO THE
TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF DRUG EVIDENCE FOUND ON
HIS PERSON WHERE HE DOES NOT ACKNOWLEDGE OR
ATTACK THE BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING, THAT
HE VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH
In Point II of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress the drug evidence seized from his person. Aplt. Br. at 9-10.
Defendant asserts that the warrantless search was unjustified because "Officer
Wurtz did not testify as to any acts that might lead him to have a suspicion that
[defendant] was armed and dangerous/ 7 Aplt. Br. at 9. Defendant's argument
overlooks the basis of the trial court's ruling, which was that defendant voluntarily
consented to the search of his person. See R66-63. Because defendant does not
acknowledge, let alone attack, the basis for the trial court's ruling, his claim of error
is inadequately briefed and should be rejected on that ground.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the argument
portion of appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on."
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As Utah courts have frequently reiterated, "a reviewing court is entitled to
have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research/ 7 State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, | 20, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988) (in turn quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784
(111. App. Ct. 1981))). Thus, when the appellant fails to present any relevant
authority, the reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritcliett, 2003
UT 24, Tf 12,69 P.3d 1278 (rejecting prosecutorial misconduct challenge). Similarly,
"[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the court will] decline to
reach the merits/ 7 State v. Gamer, 2002 UT App 234, ^ 12,52 P.3d 467. An appellant
must, in addition to citing cases, "explain why . . . the cases cited compel this court
to reverse the district c o u r t . . . . " Id.
"Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments."
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,549 (Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Wareliam, 772 P.2d
960,966 (Utah 1989)); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Yates,
834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App.
1992)); see also State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 28, 48 P.3d 872, cert denied, 535 U.S.
1062 (2002); State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, f 13, 72 P.3d 138.
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Where, as here, an appellant fails to attack the basis of the judgment below,
his argument is inadequately briefed and the judgment should be affirmed. Cf. State
v. Sorenson, 2004 UT App 381U, at *1 (affirming where Sorenson failed to challenge
two of three bases for trial court ruling:

"Sorenson does not challenge these

determinations on appeal and, accordingly, we find no reason to reverse the trial
court's denial of Sorenson's motion to suppress"); accord San Antonio Press, Inc. v.
Custom Bilt Machinery, 852 S.W.12d 64, 65 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("When a separate
and independent ground that supports a judgment is not challenged on appeal, the
appellate court must affirm"); James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc. 744 P.2d 689, 694
(Ariz. 1986) (affirming judgment below on an uncontested issue); Shraeder v. Eli Lily
& Co., 639 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. 1994) (affirming judgment below "[b]ecause
appellants have not successfully challenged one of the independent grounds
supporting summary judgment").
Here, defendant's brief contains legal authority and analysis regarding the
weapons frisk exception to the warrant requirement, but wholly fails to explain why
the cited authorities compel this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling that no
weapons frisk occurred, and that the warrantless search was justified by defendant's
voluntary consent and cooperation. See R64-63. See also Aplt. Br. at 9-10. Because
defendant fails to attack the basis of the trial court's admissibility ruling, or to
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support his claim of error with relevant authority and meaningful analysis, it is
inadequately briefed and should be rejected. See, e.g., Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, % 12;
Gamer, 2002 UT App 234, If 12. Cf. Sorenson, 2004 UT App 381U, at *1; accord San
Antonio Press, Inc., 852 S.W.2d at 65; James, 744 P.2d at 694; Shrader, 639 N.E.2d at
264.
Additionally," [c]onsent is a factual finding[.]. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f
48, 63 P.3d 650. Because defendant does not acknowledge, let alone challenge the
trial court's findings regarding his voluntary consent, he is bound by them. See State
v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, % 12,164 P.3d 397 (accepting trial court's factual findings as
conclusive where Worwood "failed to actually challenge [the] factual finding by
marshalling the evidence"); State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^ 60,28 P.3d 1278 (noting
party who wishes to challenge factual finding must first marshal supporting
evidence and show why it fails to support finding). This Court recently refused to
address any of an [appellant's] legal arguments that [were] entirely dependent on a
version of the facts that [was] contrary to the trial court's findings." Burton Lumber
& Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, ^ 13,
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P.3d

.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted 28 May 2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RUSSELL E. HURT,

Case No. 071500145
Judge Derek Pullan

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on January 23, 2008 and February 27,
2008 on Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant was present and represented by counsel,
Dana Facerayer and Sid Unrau. Plaintiff was represented by Tricia S. Lake. The Court, having
received written memorandum, and heard evidence, makes and enters the following Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On August 20, 2007, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Trooper David Wurtz of the Utah

Highway Patrol was patrolling in the area of SR 248 mile marker 6, in Wasatch County.
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2.

Trooper Wurtz observed a black, Volkswagen Jetta traveling 87 miles per hour in a 65

mile per hour zone.
3.

Trooper Wurtz executed a traffic stop on the vehicle and approached the driver side.

4.

After obtaining identifying information of the driver, Grant Black, Trooper Wurtz ran the

driver for warrants. Trooper Wurtz was told by dispatch that Mr. Black had a $1,000 warrant for
his arrest, and to use caution because Mr. Black had prior involvements with drugs, specifically
methamphetamine. Upon receiving this information, Trooper Wurtz placed Mr. Black under
arrest.
5.

Trooper Wurtz then spoke with the passenger, the defendant, inquiring as to whether he

would be willing to take Mr. Black's vehicle. The defendant did not have a driver's license in
his possession, and a subsequent license check confirmed that his license wras not valid.
6.

At this time, Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle so that the

vehicle could be searched incident to arrest, to which the defendant complied.
7.

Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant if he had any weapons on him, to which the defendant

replied that he did not.
8.

The defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he does carry pocket knives on

occasion, but that he does not own any firearms.
9.

Trooper Wurtz asked the defendant to pull his front pockets inside out so that he could

confirm that the defendant did not have any weapons.
10.

Trooper Wurtz then asked the defendant to turn around so that he could observe the

defendant's back pockets.
11.

Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that the defendant was wearing painter

pants with pockets on the thigh area, and that he observed a hard eyeglass case approximately 1.5
inches thick and 6" long sticking out of the pocket. Trooper Wurtz testified that the eyeglass
case was capable of containing a knife or a small firearm.
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12.

Trooper Wurtz then asked the defendant if he would pull out the eyeglass case and open it

to confirm that there were no weapons inside, to which the defendant complied. However, the
defendant opened and shut the case very quickly not allowing Trooper Wurtz an opportunity to
see inside the eyeglass case. This behavior caused Trooper Wurtz to believe that the defendant
was trying to obstruct his view of the inside of the eyeglass case and that the defendant was
trying to hide something.
13.

Trooper Wurtz then asked the defendant to open the eyeglass case again so that he could

confirm that there were no weapons inside the eyeglass case. The defendant complied with this
request and Trooper Wurtz was able to observe drug paraphernalia inside the eyeglass case. The
defendant then threw the eyeglass case on top of the vehicle.
14.

At no time did Trooper Wurtz execute a frisk of the defendant's person.

15.

Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that at no time did he assert a claim of

authority to search the defendant, or exhibit any force upon the defendant to get him to comply
with his requests.
16.

Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that the defendant showed no

aggression, and was cooperative in all requests made of him.
17.

Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that there were 3 other officers present

at the scene, each arriving at different times, including another UHP trooper, and two Summit
County deputies. Both Summit County deputies were not actively involved in the stop as the
location was outside their jurisdiction.
18.

The defendant testified that he had a dog in the vehicle at the time of the stop, and that the

two summit county deputies retrieved the dog from him.
19.

Trooper Wurtz testified at the suppression hearing that his intent was to execute a search

of Mr. Black's vehicle incident to arrest, along with the other UHP trooper, and therefore he had
officer safety concerns with his back being turned to the defendant during the search and his
inability to maintain a constant visual on the defendant during the search of the vehicle.
3

20.

Trooper Wurtz testified that in his experience it takes only seconds for an individual to

assault a peace officer.
21.

The Court found at the suppression hearing that Trooper Wurtz could have conducted the

search of the vehicle on his own and that the other UHP trooper could have maintained a visual
on the defendant during the search of the vehicle.
22.

The defendant has no prior felony convictions, but does have two prior convictions for

domestic violence assault, and one prior conviction for making a false report. (See State's
Exhibit 2)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
i.

Once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the peace officer

may order the driver and all passengers out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth
Amendment's proscription against unreasonable seizures. That mle is set forth in Pennsylvania
vs. Mimms case and Maryland vs. Wilson of the United States Supreme Court.
2.

That is what occurred in this case. Once the driver was placed into custody, the

Defendant was asked to step out of the vehicle.

This was necessary in order for the trooper to

effect a search of the passenger apart from the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest.
3.

Having considered the testimony and having made Findings of Fact based on that

testimony, I am satisfied that the evidence seized by Trooper Wurtz was seized pursuant to the
consent of the defendant.
4.

I am not persuaded that the officer commanded the Defendant to produce the eyeglass

case in which the contraband was discovered. There was no show of force used by the officer;
there was an absence of a claim of authority to search, the Defendant cooperated with the request
of the officer, and there was an absence of deception or trick.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Court
hereby denies defendant's motion to suppress.
4

DATED this

$ _

day of March, 2008.
BY

i«* $

APPROVED AS T0TORM:

Attorney for Defendant
RULE 4-508 Notice
You are hereby notified that the above Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress will be forwarded to the Court for signature eight days
from the date that it was mailed to you unless you notify counsel for Plaintiff
that you object to its form.
__
_
<f""""*~?

TRICIA S. LAKE, Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress was:

[ x ] mailed, first class postage pre-paid
[ ] faxed to
[ ] delivered

On this

f/T^

day of March, 2008, to the following:
Dana M. Facemyer
Attorney at Law
3610 North University Avenue
Jamestown Courtyard, Suite 375
Provo,UT 84604
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Susan Johnson f
Legal Secretary -
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Deseret News
Lehi officer shot: Police kill woman who opene
By Sara Xsraefsen-Hartley
Deseret News

LEHI — Lehi police officers and city officials are reeling from a shooting Monday morning that
sent a veteran police captain to the hospital and brought back memories of the last officer they
lost.
Just before 9 a.m., police Capt. Harold Terry pulled over a female driver suspected of being
impaired, after a gas-station clerk called 911 to report the woman had exhibited slurred speech
and poor balance.
After a short disagreement at the car window, the 34-year-old woman, who was still seated in
the car, suddenly fired twice with a .38-caliber revolver, hitting Terry twice in the left side of the
head, just above his ear. Terry was able to draw his gun and fire once into the car and back-up
officers on scene fired five rounds at the woman, killing her.
One bullet exited Terry's head and the other bullet and shrapnel were surgically removed late
Monday morning at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, where he was reported to be resting
in stable condition, surrounded by family and friends, said Lehi Police Sgt. Darren Paul.
"This is a trying time for all of us. We're all very close," Paul said, as he stood in front of the
police station that bears the name of the last officer they lost — Lt. Joseph Adams. Like Terry,
Adams had also stopped a suspected impaired driver when he was killed in August 2001.
The woman fatally shot Monday morning is from Washington state but was living in Provo and
attending school in Utah County.
Police have not released her name pending notification of her family.
Officers cannot find any indication that the woman has a criminal record, nor do they believe
she was the subject of a warrant. They will be conducting an autopsy and toxicology reports
and searching her car to determine what may have caused her behavior, Paul said.
A combined group of investigators and officials from the Utah County Attorney's Office will be
reviewing the use of force by the Lehi officers.
Traffic stops are considered the most dangerous encounters officers face," Paul said. "There
are so many unknowns."
Terry had followed the proper protocol for the stop at 1000 E. Main, in front of a busy gas
station, Paul said.
"He's a veteran leader here," Paul said. "He's very well respected and professional in how he
carries out his duties."
Although police captains are often found in an office behind a desk, Terry was out on the road
and responded when he heard the dispatch report.
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"Knowing Capt. Terry, I'm not a bit surprised," Paul said. "He leads by example."
Terry has been with Lehi for 16 years and was promoted in February to captain over the patrol
division, Paul said.
As well as leading by example, Terry also trained and taught officers.
He had just finished teaching one term of law enforcement operations at Provo College, which
focuses on the day-to-day life of a police officer, said Ken Peay, program administrator for the
criminal justice degree at Provo College.
"Harold was an excellent teacher," Peay said. "He was really, really good with his students. I
think he exemplifies the best of the best," Peay said.
Terry had taken the summer semester off but planned to come back in the fall, Peay said.
"He loved it," Peay said. "He was really good at it, you could tell how much he enjoyed it
because of his demeanor in the classroom. ... He made the classes come to life with his
experiences."
Several students have called wanting to send messages or flowers to the family, Peay said.
One of the experiences Terry shared with students included being involved in a shoot-out with a
former police comrade, Art Henderson, who had chased his ex-wife and her boyfriend through a
residential Lehi neighborhood, firing several shots at them in January/ 2006.
Lehi officers took Henderson down with several shots to the leg, and he was arrested.
Henderson was later charged with numerous felonies, including attempted aggravated murder,
but his criminal case ended in April 2006 when he hanged himself in a cell at the Salt Lake
Metro Jail.
"It's hard to think that these men and women put their lives on the line," said Lehi Mayor
Howard H. Johnson, who stopped by the station to share his love and support with the force.
Johnson, too, mentioned Adams when he talked about Monday's shooting. The poignant
memory of the fallen officer is something no one has forgotten.
In the August 2001 shooting, Adams found a bag of cocaine in a car he had pulled over, told
the driver he was under arrest and began to handcuff him. Somehow the driver got one hand
free, grabbed a handgun from his belt and shot Adams.
Although wounded in two places, Adams was able to return fire, hitting the man multiple times.
With a handcuff dangling from one wrist, the shooter, Arturo Javier Scott Welch, got in his car
and drove away, according to Utah County Sheriff's officials. He was captured by Salt Lake
County Sheriffs deputies at a gas station in Draper.
Welch, 23, pleaded guilty to aggravated murder the following year and was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole.
At the time of that shooting, Adams, a three-year member of the Lehi Police Department, was
married and had an 8-month-old son.
In the aftermath of Monday's shooting, the task now is to support and pray for Terry and his
family, as well as the family in Washington that has lost a loved one, the mayor said.
"Right now, we'll do the best we can, pray and hope the Lord sees fit to bless him extra,"
Johnson said.

http://www.deseretnews.eom/article/content/mobile/l,5620,700237401.00 htmPnnntVi^i/

He extolled the police officers, saying that many people don't pick professions with inherent
risks or obstacles.
"But these good (officers) take a job that has them all," he said. "And they do it with a sense of
cheer and happiness. We live in debt to them every day."

E-mail: sisraelsen^desnews com
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Her family thought meets had ailment under control

Woman killed after shooting Lehi cop had his
mental illness
By Melinda Rogers and Nate Carlisle
The Salt Lake Tribune
Article Last Updated: 06/24/2008 01:31:56 PM MDT

The family of Kelly Wark says the 34-year-old had been struggling with
mental illness for several months before she opened fire on a Lehi police
$
captain during a traffic stop Monday and was killed by return fire.
"She had struggled with severe mental illness in the past year and was on
her way to beginning a new life," Wark's parents, Robert and Mary Wark
of Gig Harbor, Wash., wrote in a statement released today. "We offer our
deepest condolences to the family of the officer that was hurt."
Gwyn Vukich, a cousin of the Wark family who is serving as the Wark
family's spokesperson, would not elaborate on specifics of Kelly Wark's
mental illness. But she said her cousin was on medication, and that her
death came as a shock for family who
believed she had her illness under
control.
Wark had moved to Utah to attend massage therapy school and excelled
at art, Vukich said. She specialized in portraits and had earned degrees in
art and psychology from Western Washington University in Bellingham
Lehi sh
before she decided she wanted to become a massage therapist, Vukich said.
Jun 24:
I n hi
in Le
Her parents called Wrark a "gentle, kind and loving person" in the
and !
statement.
Police say WTark shot Capt. Harold Terry twice in the head after he
pulled her over in response to reports of a woman who might be driving under the infl
hospitalized in serious condition this afternoon but is expected to make a full recover
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